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Abstract
Itamar Pitowsky long championed the view that quantum mechanics (QM) is best understood as
a non-classical probability theory. Here, I want to offer some modest caveats. One is that QM is best
seen, not as a new probability theory, but as something narrower, namely, a particular probabilistic
theory — roughly, a class of probabilistic models, selected from within a much more general framework.
It is this general framework that, if anything, deserves to be regarded as a “non-classical” probability
theory. However, as I will also argue, this framework represents a very conservative extension of
classical probability theory, essentially just eliding a tacit, and contingent, assumption in the latter that
measurements or experiments can always be performed together. Moreover, for individual probabilistic
models, and even for probabilistic theories, the distinction between “classical” and a “non-classical” is
largely a conventional one, bound up with the question of what one means by the state of a system.
In fact, for systems with a high degree of symmetry, including quantum mechanics, it is possible to
interpret general probabilistic models as having a perfectly classical probabilistic structure, but an
additional dynamical structure: states, rather than corresponding simply to probability measures, are
represented as certain probability measure-valued functions on the system’s symmetry group, and thus,
as fundamentally dynamical objects. Conversely, a classical probability space equipped with reasonably
well-behaved family of such “dynamical states” can be interpreted as a generalized probabilistic model
in a canonical way. It is noteworthy that this “dynamical” representation is not a conventional hidden-
variables representation, and the question of what one means by “non-locality” in this setting is not
entirely straightforward.
1 Introduction
Itamar Pitowsky long championed the idea (also associated with Jeff Bub, among others) that quantum
theory is best viewed as a non-classical probability theory [21]. This position is strongly motivated by
the fact that the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics can largely be reduced to the statement
that the binary observables — the physically measurable, {0, 1}-valued quantitites — associated with a
quantum system are represented by the projection operators on a Hilbert space, or, more generally, the
projections in a von Neumann algebra, in such a way that commuting families of projections can be jointly
measured and mutually orthogonal projections are mutually exclusive.1 In other words, mathematically,
quantum theory is what one gets when one replaces the Boolean algebras of classical probability theory with
projection lattices. It is very natural to conclude from this that quantum theory simply is a “non-classical”
or “non-commutative” probability theory.
1Given this, Gleason’s Theorem, as extended by Christensen and Yeadon, identifies the system’s states with states (positive,
normalized linear functionals) on that same von Neumann algebra, and Wigner’s Theorem then identifies the possible dynamics
with one-parameter groups of unitary elements of that algebra. For the details, see [24].
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This point of view has many attractions, not least that it more or less dissolves what Pitowsky called the
“big” measurement problem [7, 21]. It also allows one to ask why quantum mechanics has the particular
non-classical probabilistic structure that it does. The past decade or two has seen a good deal of progress
on this question, at least as it pertains to finite-dimensional quantum systems [5, 9, 13, 19, 28], The upshot
is that the probabilistic apparatus of finite-dimensional QM can be reconstructed from various different
packages of assumptions, all having a broadly probabilistic character, lending some further support to
Pitowsky’s position.
Here, I want to offer some modest caveats. The first is that how we understand Pitowski’s thesis depends on
how we understand probabability theory itself. On the view that I favor, quantum mechanics (henceforth,
QM) is best seen, not as replacement for general classical probability theory, but rather, as a specific class
of probabilistic models — a probabilistic theory — defined within a much broader framework, in which
individual models are defined by essentially arbitrary sets of basic measurements and states, with the
latter assigning probabilities (in an elementary sense) to outcomes of the former. It is this framework
that, if anything, counts as a “non-classical” probability theory — but in fact, I think we should regard,
and refer to, this general framework, simply as probability theory, without any adjective. Since it outruns
what’s usually studied under that heading, I settle here for the term general probability theory.2 Within
this framework, in addition to QM, we can identify classical probability theory, in the strict Kolmogorovian
sense, as a special, and, I will argue, equally contingent, probabilistic theory.
However — and this is my second point — even as applied to individual probabilistic models, or, indeed,
individual probabilistic theories, the distinction between “classical” and “non-classical” is not so clear cut.
One standard answer to the question of what makes the probabilistic apparatus of QM “non-classical” is
that its state space (the set of density operators on a Hilbert space, or the set of states on a non-abelian
von Neumann algebra, depending on how general we want to be) is not a simplex: the same state can
be realized as a mixture — a convex combination — of pure states in many different ways. Another,
related, answer is that, whereas in classical probability theory any two measurements (or, if you prefer,
experiments) can effectively be performed jointly, in QM this is not the case.
Neither of these answers is really satisfactory. In the first place, it is perfectly within the scope of standard
classical probability theory to consider restricted sets of probability measures and random variables on a
given measurable space: the former need not be simplices, and the latter need not be closed under the
formation of joint random variables. We might also wish to allow “unsharp” random variables having some
intrinsic randomness (represented, depending on one’s taste, by Markov kernels or by response-function
valued measures). We might try to identify as “broadly classical” just those probabilistic models arising
in this way, from a measurable space plus some selection of probability measures and (possibly unsharp)
random variables. But once we open the door this far, it’s difficult to keep it on its hinges. This is because
there exist straightforward, well known, and in a sense even canonical, recipes for representing essentially
any “non-classical” probabilistic model in terms of such a broadly classical one, either by treating the
state space as a suitable quotient of a simplex (in the manner of the Beltrametti-Bugajski representation
of quantum mechanics), or by introducing contextual “hidden variables”. In fact, for systems with a
high degree of symmetry, including finite-dimensional quantum systems, there is another, less well known,
but equally straightforward classical representation: the probabilistic structure is simply that of a single
reference observable, and hence, entirely classical; states, however, rather than corresponding simply to
probability measures, are represented by probability measure-valued functions on the system’s symmetry
group, and thus, as fundamentally dynamical objects. Conversely, a classical probability space equipped
with a family of suitably covariant such “dynamical states” — what I call a dynamical classical model —
can be interpreted as a generalized probabilistic model in a canonical way.
At the level of individual probabilistic models, then, it seems that the distinction between classical and non-
classical is, at least mathematically, more or less one of convention (and, pragmatically, of convenience).
There is, of course, another consideration in play: that of locality. For probabilistic theories involving a
2The framework in question is broadly equivalent to that of “generalized probabilistic theories”. Luckily, both phrases can
go by the acronym GPT.
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notion of composite systems that admits entangled states — including, of course, quantum theory — the
classical representations alluded to above are all manifestly non-local in one sense or another. One reading
of Bell’s Theorem is that, for such probabilistic theories, there is a necessary tension between “classicality”
and locality. Indeed, one standard response to the existence of various classical representations is to dismiss
them precisely because they are non-local. But locality is very much a physical constraint, rather than a “law
of thought”. Thus, we should be careful not to regard the probabilistic apparatus of quantum mechanics
as a successor to classical probability theory as a general account of reasoning in the face of uncertainty.
Rather, it is a particular, contingent, probabilistic physical theory, expressible in terms of a much broader
generalized probability theory — a framework that we may or may not prefer to regard as non-classical,
but which is in any event at most a very conservative generalization of classical probability theory. It is a
collateral aim of this Chapter to argue for this expansive view of what probability theory is.
A brief outline of this Chapter is as follows. In section 2, I give a condensed introduction to the framework
— or rather, one particular version of the framework — of general(ized) probability theory, along the lines
of [4]. It is another collateral aim of this paper to advertise this framework as offering some additional
measure of clarity to discussions of foundational issues in quantum theory. In section 3, I ask how one ought
to characterize classical probabilistic models in this framework, and review several more or less canonical
ways in which an arbitrary probabilistic model can be interpreted in terms of a classical one. There is
little here that is new, except possibly some streamlining of the material. In section 4, I introduce the
dynamical classical models alluded to above. In section 5, I very briefly discuss some issues of locality,
entanglement and so forth in this context, and in Section 6, I gather a few concluding thoughts. I have
placed some technical material in a series of appendices. Appendix A establishes a folk-result, to the effect
that a probabilistic model in which any two measurements are compatible in the sense of admitting a
common refinement, is essentially classical. Appendix B gathers some straightforward observations about
what are called semiclassical test spaces. Appendix C concerns a construction that can be used to generate
large numbers of highly symmetric probabilistic models, or, equivalently, dynamical classical models. This
follows, but in some respects generalizes, material in [27]. To keep measure-theoretic details to a minimum,
I focus mainly (though not exclusively) on probabilistic models in which there is a finite upper bound on
the number of distinct outcomes in a basic measurement.
Terminology: In the balance of this chapter, I will use the adjective classical sometimes in a broad and
informal way, sometimes in a more technical sense, and sometimes ironically. I hope that context, occasion-
ally aided by scare-quotes, will help make my meaning clear in each case. The term classical representation
is also to be understood broadly and somewhat informally, to mean any mathematical representation of
a one probabilistic model or theory in terms of another such model or theory, the latter being in some
reasonable sense classical. At two points, my mathematical usage may be slightly nonstandard: first, by a
measurable space, I will always mean a pair (S,Σ) where S is a set and Σ is an algebra, but not necessarily
a σ-algebra, of subsets of S; and by a measure on S, unless otherwise specified I mean a finitely-additive
measure. Secondly, by a discrete Markov kernel I mean a function p : S×T → [0, 1], where S and T are sets,
possibly infinite, such that
∑
y∈T p(x, y) = 1 for every x ∈ S, where the sum is meant in the unordered
sense. Otherwise, my usage will be fairly standard. Terms likely to be unfamiliar to most readers are
defined when introduced.
2 Probability theory vs probabilistic theories
This section provides a brief but self-contained tutorial on the mathematical framework that I favor for a
general probability theory. This is a slight elaboration of a formalism developed by D. J. Foulis and C. H.
Randall; see, e.g., [11, 12]. A more complete survey can be found in [4].
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2.1 Test spaces, probability weights, and probabilistic models
In many introductory treatments of probability theory, a probabilistic model is defined as a pair (E, p)
where E is the outcome-set of some experiment, and p is a probability weight on E, meant to reflect the
actual statistical behaviour of the experiment. An obvious generalization is to allow p to vary, i.e., to
consider pairs (E,Ω) where Ω is some set of possible probability weights. For example, if E = {0, 1}n, we
might want to restrict attention to binomial probability weights with various probabilities of success.
An only slightly less obvious generalization is to allow E, too, to vary:
Definition 2.1 (Test spaces) A test space is a set M of non-empty sets E,F, ...., understood as the
outcome-sets of various experiments or, as we’ll say, tests. If X :=
⋃M is the set of all outcomes of all
tests in M, a probability weight on M is a function α : X → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈E α(x) = 1 for every
E ∈M.
I will write Pr(M) for the set of all probability weights on a test space M. Note that Pr(M) is a
convex subset of RX : any weighted average pα+ (1− p)β of probability weights α, β ∈ Pr(M) is again a
probability weight on M.
Definition 2.2 (Probabilistic models) A probabilistic model is a pair A = (M,Ω) where M is a test
space and Ω ⊆ Pr(M) is a convex set of probability weights on M, which we call the states of the model.
Extreme points of Ω are called pure states.
It will be convenient to denote a probabilistic model by a single letter A, B, etc. When doing so, I
write, e.g., A = (M(A),Ω(A)). The assumption that Ω(A) is convex is meant to reflect the possibility
of randomizing the preparation of states; that is, if we have some procedure that produces state α and
another that produces state β, we could flip a suitably biased coin to product the state pα + (1 − p)β
for any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. It is also common to equip a probabilistic model A with a preferred group G(A) of
“physical transformations” [10, 13, 19], and I will also do so in Section 4. Until then, however, this extra
structure will not be necessary. Finally, I will suppose in what follows that Ω contains sufficiently many
probability weights to separate points of X and that M contains sufficiently many tests (and hence X,
sufficiently many outcomes) to distinguish the states in Ω (since otherwise, one would presumably just
identify outcomes, respectively states, that are not distinguishable). Another condition that I will often
(but not always) impose is that, for every outcome x ∈ X(A), there exists at least one probability weight
α ∈ Ω(A) with α(x) = 1. A model satisfying this condition is said to be unital.
Notice that we permit tests E,F ∈M to intersect, that is, to share outcomes. From a certain point of
view, this is absurd: when we perform a measurement, we usually retain a record of what measurement
we’ve made! Nevertheless, we may have good reasons to want to identify outcomes from distinct tests, and
to demand that physically meaningful operations on outcomes — symmetries, probability assignments, etc.
— respect these identifications. The usual term for this is non-contextuality. In most of the probabilistic
models one encounters in practice, such outcome-identifications are in fact made, and in any event, it is
mathematically more general to allow tests to overlap than to forbid them to do so. Moreover, contextual
probability weights can easily be accommodated by way of the following construction.
Definition 2.3 (Semi-classical test spaces) A test space M is semi-classical iff E ∩ F = ∅ for all
distinct tests E,F ∈M. The semi-classical cover of an arbitrary test space M is the test space
M˜ = { E˜ |E ∈M },
where, for E ∈M, E˜ = {(x,E)|x ∈ E}.
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The outcome-set of M˜ is thus X˜ = {(x,E)|x ∈ E ∈M}, i.e., the the coproduct of the sets E ∈M.
“Contextual” probability weights onM are best regarded as probability weights on M˜. In general Pr(M˜)
will be very much larger than Pr(M); indeed, if M contains infinitely many tests, Pr(M˜) will be infinite
dimensional, even if Pr(M) is finite-dimensional.
Definition 2.4 A probability weight α on M is dispersion-free or deterministic iff α(x) ∈ {0, 1} for every
x ∈ X = ⋃M.
One of the most obvious distinctions between the probabilistic models associated with “classical” systems
and those associated with quantum-mechanical systems is that the former have an abundance of dispersion-
free states, while the latter, absent superselection rules, have none at all. Notice, however, that M˜ always
has an abundance of dispersion-free probability weights (just choose an outcome from every test).
Definition 2.5 (Locally finite test spaces) A test space M is locally finite iff every test E ∈M is a
finite set. Every test space is associated with a locally finite test space M#, consisting of finite partitions
of tests in M. That is, writing D(E) for the set of finite partitions of a set E,
M# =
⋃
E∈M
D(E).
If M is a test space, an event for M is a subset of a test (that is, an event in the standard sense pertaining
to that test). We write Ev(M) for the set of all events of M, so that Ev(M) = ⋃E∈M P(E). Thus, the
outcome-space for M# is precisely the set Ev(M)r {∅} of non-empty events.
If α is a probability weight on M, then we define the probability of an event a ∈ Ev(M) by α(a) =∑
x∈a α(x). This evidently defines a probability weight on M#. However, unless M is locally finite to
begin with, M# will generally support many additional “singular” probability weights. (Indeed, if M is
semiclassical with infinite tests, one can simply choose a non-prinicipal ultrafilter on each E ∈M.)
Lemma 2.6 Let M be locally finite with outcome-set X. Then the convex set Pr(M) of probability
weights on M is compact as a subset of [0, 1]X (with the product topology).
Proof: Since each E ∈M(A) is finte, the pointwise limit of a net of probability weights will continue to
sum to unity over E. Thus, Pr(M) is closed, and hence, compact, in [0, 1]X . 
It follows that if A is a probabilistic model with M(A) locally finite, the closure of Ω(A) in Pr(M(A))
will also be compact. Because it is both mathematically convenient and operationally reasonable to do
so, I shall assume from now on that, unless otherwise indicated, all probabilistic models A under
discussion have a locally finite test space M(A) and a closed, hence compact, state space
Ω(A). While I will make no direct use of it, it’s worth noting that the Krein-Milman Theorem now tells
us that every state in Ω(A) is a limit of convex combinations of pure states.
It is often useful to consider sub-normalized positive weights on a test space M, that is, functions α : X :=⋃M → R+ such that ∑x∈E α(x) =: r ≤ 1, independently of E. In fact, these are simply probability
weights on a slightly larger test space:
Definition 2.7 (Adjoining a null-outcome) If M is a test space with outcome-space X, let ∗ be sym-
bol not belonging to X, and define M+ = {E ∪ {∗} | E ∈M}.
5
We can think of ∗ as a “null outcome” representing the failure of a test, in a setting in which we regard
this failure as meaning the same thing regardless of which test is performed. As an extreme example, ∗
might represent the destruction of the system under study. It should be clear that a probability weight on
M+ corresponds exactly to a sub-normalized weight on M.
2.2 Some Examples
Example 2.8 (Kolmogorovian models) We can treat standard measure-theoretic probability theory
within the present framework in the following way. Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space and let D(S,Σ) be
the set of finite partitions of S by elements of Σ, regarded as a test space. Note that X =
⋃D(S,Σ) is
simply Σ r {∅}. A probability weight on D(S,Σ), then, is a function p : Σ r {∅} → [0, 1] summing to
unity on every finite partition of S by members of Σ. It is straightforward to show that such a function,
extended to all of Σ by setting p(∅) = 0, is a finitely additive probability measure on Σ, and conversely.
We can now construct a probabilistic model (D(S,Σ),Ω) in various ways, for instance, by taking Ω to
consist of all such measures, or of all σ-additive probability measures, or of probability measures absolutely
continuous with respect to some given measure, or of a single probability measure of intererest, etc. I will
refer to all models of the form (D(S,Σ),Ω), where Ω is any convex set of probability measures on (S,Σ),
as Kolmogorovian.3
Note that every point s ∈ S defines a dispersion-free probability weight onD(S,Σ), namely, the point-mass
δs(b) = 1 if b ∈ Σ with s ∈ b, and δs(b) = 0 otherwise. More generally, a dispersion-free probability weight
on D(S,Σ) is an ultrafilter on Σ.
Example 2.9 (Quantum models) IfH is a Hilbert space, let X(H) denoteH’s unit sphere andM(H),
the set of maximal pairwise orthogonal subsets of X(H), that is, the set of unordered orthonormal bases
of H. We shall call this the quantum test space associated with H. Any density operator W on H gives
rise to a probability weight αW on M(H), given by αW (x) = 〈Wx, x〉4. Let Ω(H) be the set of all
probability weights on M(H) arising from density operators in this way: then A(H) := (M(H),Ω(H))
is a probabilistic model representing the same quantum-mechanical system one associates with H, but in
a manner that puts its probabilistic structure in the foreground. Note that H is finite-dimensional, Ω(H)
is compact, and vice versa.
While the model above is mathematically attractive, it is more usual to identify measurement outcomes
with projection operators. The projective quantum test space consists of sets of projections pi on H
summing to 1. If ρ is a density operator on H, we obtain a probability weight (also denoted by ρ) given by
ρ(p) = Tr(ρp). Letting Ω consist of all such probability weights, we obtain what we can call the projective
quantum model. More generally still, if A is a von Neumann algebra (or, for that matter, any ring with
identity), the collection M(A) of sets E of projections p ∈ A with ∑p∈E p = 1 is a test space, on which
every state on A gives rise to a probability weight by evaluation. In this case, we might identify Ω with the
state space (in the usual sense) of A, which is weak-∗ compact, but which contains a host of non-normal
states.
Two pathological examples The following simple examples are useful as illustrations of the range of
possibilities comprended by the formalism sketched above.
Example 2.10 (Two bits) Let M = {{a, a′}, {b, b′}} be a test space consisting of two yes-no tests, one
with outcomes a and a′, the other with outcomes b and b′. The space of all probability weights on M
3This is one setting in which we would often not require Ω to be closed. For instance, if Ω = ∆σ(S,Σ), then Ω is not
closed in the topology of event-wise convergence.
4Gleason’s Theorem tells us that if dim(H) > 2, all probability weights arise in this way, but we will not make use of this
fact.
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is essentially the unit square, since such a weight α is determined by the pair (α(a), α(b)). While the
state space is not a simplex, pure states are dispersion-free. The square bit B and diamond bit B′ are the
probabilistic models having the same test space, namely
M(B) =M(B′) =M,
but the two different state spaces pictured below:
x
y
1
1
Ω(B) = all prob weights on M(B) Ω(B′)
Figure 1: two bits
The square bit figures, directly or indirectly, in the large literature on “PR boxes” inaugurated by [22].
While the state space of B′ is affinely isomorphic to that of B, it interacts with M differently. While both
models are unital, in B′, for each outcome x there is a unique state δx with δx(x) = 1.
Example 2.11 (The Wright triangle5) A more interesting example consists of three overlapping, three-
outcome tests pasted together in a loop, as in Figure 2:
M = {{a, x, b}, {b, y, c}, {c, z, a}}
a x b
y
c
z
Figure 2: A “Greechie diagram” of the Wright Triangle, in which outcomes belonging to a
commont test lie along a smooth curve (here, a straight line).
Here the space Pr(M) of all probability weights onM is three-dimensional, since such a weight is uniquely
determined by the triple (α(a), α(b), α(c)). It is not difficult to check that Ω is spanned by four dispersion-
free states, determined by
α(a) = α(y) = 1, β(b) = β(z) = 1, γ(c) = γ(x) = 1 and δ(x) = δ(y) = δ(y) = 1,
and a fifth, non-dispersion free pure state
(a) = (b) = (c) = 1/2, (x) = (y) = (z) = 0.
In particular, Pr(M) is not a simplex, and not all pure states are dispersion-free.
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2.3 Probabilistic models linearized
It is often convenient to consider the vector space V(A) ≤ RX(A) spanned by the state space Ω(A). This
carries an obvious pointwise order. Writing V(A)+ for the cone of all α ∈ V(A) with α(x) ≥ 0 for all
x ∈ X(A), it is not difficult to see that each α ∈ V(A)+ has the form α = rβ where β ∈ Ω(A) and r ≥ 0.
Moreover, the coefficient r is unique, so Ω(A) is a base for the cone V(A)+.
An effect on A is a functional f : V(A) → R with 0 ≤ f(α) ≤ 1 for α ∈ Ω(A). Every outcome x ∈ X(A)
determines an effect x̂ ∈ V(A)∗ by evaluation, that is, by x̂(α) = α(x) for all α ∈ V(A). We can regard
an arbitrary f as representing an “in-principle” measurement outcome, not necessarily included among
the outcomes in X(A), but consistent with the convex structure of Ω(A): f(α) is the probability of the
effect f occuring (if measured) in the state α. There is a unique unit effect uA given by u(α) = 1 for all
α ∈ Ω(A), representing the trivial outcome “something happened”. If f is an effect, so is uA − f =: f ′;
we interpret f ′ as representing the event that f did not occur. Thus, the pair {f, f ′} is an in-principle
test (measurement, experiment) not necessarily included in M(A). More generally, if f1, ..., fn are distinct
effects with
∑
i fi = uA, we regard {f1, ..., fn} as an “in principle” measurement or experiment — the
standard term is “discrete observable” — not necessarily included in the catalogue M(A), but consistent
with the structure of Ω(A). Each test E ∈M(A) gives rise to a discrete observable {x̂|x ∈ E} in this
sense.
Examples 2.12 (a) As an illustration, let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, and let ∆ = ∆(S,Σ) be the space
of finitely additive probability measures on Σ. Then V(∆) is the space of all signed measures µ = µ+−µ−
on Σ, where µ+ and µ− are positive measures. Any measurable function ζ : S → [0, 1] defines an effect
a through the recipe a(µ) =
∫
S
ζ(s)dµ(s). One can think of such an effect as a “fuzzy” or “unsharp”
version of an indicator function (modelling, perhaps, a detector that responds with probability ζ(s) when
the system is in a state s). The unit effect is the constant function 1. A discrete observable, accordingly,
represents a generalization of a “fuzzy” or unsharp version of a finite measurable partition.
(b) In the case of a quantum-mechanical model, say A = A(H), if we identify Ω(A) with the set of density
operators on H, then V(A) can be identified with the space of all compact self-adjoint operators on H,
ordered in the usual way; V(A)∗ is then naturally isomorphic, as an ordered vector space, to the space of
all bounded self-adjoint operators on H, and an effect is an effect in the usual quantum-mechanical sense,
that is, a positive self-adjoint operator a with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, where 1 is the identity operator on H, which
serves as the unit effect in this case. A discrete observable corresponds to a discrete positive-operator
valued measure (POVM) with values in N.
Unlike a test in M(A), a general discrete observable on A can have repeated values. Nevertheless, by
considering their graphs, such observables can be organized into a test space, as follows. Here, [0, uA]
denotes the set of all effects on A, and (0, uA] denotes the set of non-zero effects.
Definition 2.13 (Ordered tests) The space of ordered tests over the convex set Ω is the test space
Mo(Ω) with
(a) Outcome-space Xo(Ω) := N× (0, u];
(b) Tests, those finite sets a ⊆ Xo that are graphs of mappings a : I → (0, u] with ∑i∈I ai = u,
where I ⊆ N is finite.
In other words, tests in Mo(Ω) are (graphs of) finite discrete observables with finite value-spaces I ⊆ N.
Every state α ∈ Ω defines a probability weight αo on Mo(Ω) by αo(i, a) = α(a).6 In effect, Mo(Ω) is the
largest test space supporting Ω as a separating set of probability weights.
6It can be shown that, conversely, every probability weight on Mo(Ω) is determined by a finitely-additive normalized
measure on the effect algebra [0, u], and hence, by a positive linear functional in V(A)∗∗. Hence, probability weights on
Mo(Ω) that are continuous on (0, u] in the latter’s relative weak-∗ topology, arise from elements of Ω.
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2.4 Probabilistic theories
A probabilistic theory ought to be more than a collection of probabilistic models. One also needs a collection
of allowed mappings between such models turning C into a category. There are many plausible ways to
define a morphism between probabilistic models, some more restrictive, some very general (see, e.g., [4, 11]).
For the purposes of this chapter, it will be sufficient to consider the following, relatively strict definition
(due to Foulis and Randall [11]). Recall that Ev(M) denotes the set of events (subsets of tests) for a test
space M. Given two events a, b ∈ Ev(M), we write a ⊥ b to mean that a ∩ b = ∅ and a ∪ b is again an
event. That is, a ⊥ b iff a and b are compatible (jointly testable), and mutually exclusive.
Definition 2.14 (Interpretations) Let M and M′ be test spaces with outcome-sets X and X ′. An
interpretation from M to M′ is a mapping φ : X −→ Ev(M′) such that if x ⊥ y in X, then φ(x) ⊥ φ(y)
in Ev(M′) and ⋃x∈E φ(x) ∈M′ for all E ∈M.
In other words, an interpretation φ : M→M′ allows us to regard (to interpret!) each test E ∈M as a
coarse-grained version of a test in M′, in a non-contextual way.
Definition 2.14 (Continued): The following terminology will be useful. An interpretation φ :M→M′
is outcome-preserving iff φ(x) is either empty or a singleton for every x ∈ X, in which case we can identify
φ with the corresponding partial mapping from the outcome space X =
⋃M to the outcome space
X ′ =
⋃M′. If φ(x) is non-empty for every x ∈ ⋃M, then φ is positive. A positive, outcome-preserving
interpretation φ :M→M′, amounts to a mapping φ : X → X ′ with φ(M) ⊆M′. Where this mapping
φ is injective, allowing us to identify M with a subset of M′, we call it an embedding. Where φ is positive
and φ(M) =M′, we will say that φ is a cover of M′ by M. Where φ is bijective on both outcomes and
tests, we call it an isomorphism of test spaces.
Examples 2.15 (a) If (S,Σ) and (T,Ξ) are measuable spaces, any measurable mapping f : S → T gives
rise to an outcome-preserving interpretation φ : D(T,Ξ) → D(S,Σ), given by φ(b) = {f−1(b)} when
f−1(b) 6= ∅, and φ(b) = ∅ otherwise.
(b) Suppose K1 and K2 are compact convex sets and f : K1 → K2 is an affine mapping, we can define an
outcome-preserving interpretation φ :Mo(K2)→Mo(K1) by setting
φ(i, b) =
{ {(i, b ◦ f)} b ◦ f 6= 0
∅ b ◦ f = 0
(c) For an example of a positive but not outcome-preserving interpretation, consider the inclusion mapping
Ev(M) r {∅} → Ev(M): we can understand this as an interpretation M# →M taking a non-empty
event qua outcome of M# to the same event viewed as a set of outcomes of M.
Notice that any interpretation φ : M1 →M2 gives rise to an affine mapping φ∗ : Pr(M2) → Pr(M1),
defined for β ∈ Ω(M2) by φ∗(β) = β ◦ φ.
Definition 2.16 (Interpretations of models) An interpretation φ : A→ B from a probabilistic model
A to a probabilistic model B is an interpretation φ : M(A) →M(B) such that φ∗(Ω(B)) ⊆ Ω(A). We
say that φ is
(a) an embedding iff φ is an embedding of test spaces and φ∗ is surjective;
(b) a cover iff φ is a cover of M(B) by M(A), in which case φ∗ is injective.
The affine mapping φ∗ : Ω(B)→ Ω(A) extends uniquely to a positive linear mapping φ∗ : V(B)→ V(A),
satisfying uA ◦ φ∗ = uB . An apparently much more general notion of a morphism from a model A to
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a model B is a positive linear mapping Φ : V(B) → V(A) with the feature that uA ◦ Φ ≤ uB , that
is, uB(Φ(β)) ≤ 1 for all β ∈ Ω(B) [4]. Such a map represents a possibly “lossy” process that, given
as input a state β ∈ Ω(B), produces an output state α := Φ(β)/uB(Φ(β)) with probability uB(Φ(β))
— or, if uB(Φ(β)) = 0, simply destroys the system. However, given such a mapping Φ, and letting
∇(A) denote the convex set of sub-normalized states rα were r ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ Ω(B), we can define an
interpretation φ : Mo(∇(A)) →Mo(Ω(B)) as in Example 2.15 (b) above. Thus, we actually lose very
little, if any, generality in restricting attension to categories of probabilistic models and interpretations. In
the remainder of this chapter, a probabilistic theory will always mean such a category.
3 Classicality and Classical Representations
There are various ways of representing probabilistic models in terms of classical probabilistic models, most
of them reasonably familiar in the context of QM. In this section, I want to discuss two of these that are
rather canonical, both in the informal sense that they are more or less obvious, and apply to more or less
arbitrary probabilistic models, and also in the technical sense that the constructions involved are actually
functorial. Of these, it is my sense that only the first is really well known.
3.1 Classical models and classical embeddings
Before we can discuss these representations, we need to address head on the central concern of this chapter:
what does it mean (what ought it to mean) for a probabilistic model A to be “classical”? Whatever our
final answer, presumably we would at least wish to consider models A(S,Σ) := (D(S,Σ),∆σ(S,Σ)) as
classical. However, as discussed earlier, even classically it won’t do to restrict attention to such models:
any model of the form (D(S,Σ),Ω) where Ω is any subset of ∆σ(S,Σ), should almost certainly count as
“classical”, in the sense of falling within the scope of classical probability theory [18].
We should also pause to ask whether or not the restriction to σ-additive measures should be regarded as
one of the defining features of classicality. If µ is a finitely additive measure on an algebra Σ of sets, then
letting T = β(Σ) be the Stone space of Σ, regarded as a Boolean algebra, one finds that, owing to the fact
that elements of Σ are clopen in T and T is compact, no countable disjoint family of sets in Σ has union
equal to T . Hence, every measure on (T,Σ) is countably additive by default. In different language, whether
or not a measure on a Boolean algebra Σ is countably additive depends on the particular representation
of Σ as an algebra of sets.
For this reason, it seems prudent to allow any Kolmogorovian model, in the sense of Example 2.8 — that is,
any probabilistic model of the form (D(S,Σ),Ω), where Σ is any algebra of subsets of S and Ω is any convex
set of probability measures on Σ, countably additive or otherwise, to count as “classical”. But if this is so,
it seems equally reasonable to admit as classical models of the form (M,Ω) as long as M ⊆ D(S,Σ) and
Ω ⊆ ∆(S,Σ). That is, models admitting embeddings, in the sense of Definition 2.16, into Kolmogorovian
models in the sense of Example 2.8, should themselves be considered “classical” in a broad sense.
When does an abstract model (M,Ω) admit such a classical embedding? If φ : M(A) → D(S,Σ) is
an interpretation, then every point-mass δs in ∆(S,Σ) pulls back along φ to a dispersion-free probability
weight on M(A). If φ is to be an embedding of test spaces, there must be enough of these dispersion-free
states to separate outcomes in X(A). Moreover, if φ is to be an embedding of probabilistic models, every
state α ∈ Ω(A) must belong to the closed convex hull of these dispersion-free weights.
Definition 3.1 (UDF models) A probabilistic model A is unitally dispersion-free or UDF iff every state
α ∈ Ω(A) lies in the closed convex hull of the set of dispersion-free probability weights on M(A).
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Versions of the following can be found in many places in the quantum-logical literature.
Lemma 3.2 A model admits a classical embedding iff it is UDF.
Proof: The “only if” direction is clear from the discussion above. For the converse, suppose (M,Ω) is
UDF, and let S be the set of dispersion-free probability weights on M. For each x ∈ X := ⋃M, let
ax := {s ∈ S|s(x) = 1} ⊆ S.
Then {ax|x ∈ E} is a partition of S. Let Σ be the algebra of subsets of S generated by sets of the form
ax. Then the mapping φ : X → Σ given by φ(x) = ax gives rise to an outcome-preserving interpretation
M→ D(S,Σ), which is an embedding if and only if S separates points of X. The mapping φ∗ : RΣ → RX
given by φ∗(µ)(x) = µ(ax) is continuous with respect to the product topologies on these spaces, and for
each s ∈ S, φ∗(δs) = s. It follows that con(S) = φ∗(∆(S,Σ)). Hence, the probability weights in con(S)
have a common classical explanation. Given any closed convex set Ω ⊆ con(S), we then have an embedding
of the model (M,Ω) into the Kolmogorovian model (D(S,Σ), (φ∗)−1(Ω)). 
Let me stress that it is not sufficient for M(A) simply to have a large supply of dispersion-free probability
weights: we also require that all of the allowed states α ∈ Ω(A) arise as (limits of) averages of these. As an
example, the Wright Triangle admits many dispersion-free states, but also a non-dispersion-free extreme
state, which can not be explained in terms of a classical embedding.
Of course, if M(A) has no dispersion-free states at all, then such a classical embedding is impossible in
any case. Gleason’s Theorem tells us that Ω(H) has no dispersion-free states if dim(H) ≥ 3; this is the
substance of one of the strongest “no-go” theorems for hidden variables. However, this is far from the
end of the story. For one thing, the classical embeddings considered above are non-contextual. That is, if
x ∈ E ∩ F , where E,F ∈M(A), then φ(x) does not depend on whether we regard x as an outcome of E
or of F . As was realized very early on, making φ(x) depend also on the choice of “measurement context”
(e.g., E or F , above) allows for much more flexibility.
Besides the existence of an abundance of dispersion-free states, a distinctive feature of Kolmogorovian
models is that any two partitions E,F ∈ D(S,Σ) can be regarded as coarse-grained versions of a common
refinement: if
G = { a ∩ b | a ∈ E, b ∈ F, a ∩ b 6= ∅ }
then G ∈ D(S,Σ), and every a ∈ E, and likewise every b ∈ F , is in an obvious sense equivalent to a subset
of G. This allows us to make a simultaneous joint measurement of E and F , by performing a measurement
of G. One can define a general notion of the refinement of one test by another in the context of an arbitrary
probabilistic model, as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Refinement) A test E ∈M(A) refines a test F ∈M(A) iff there exists a surjection
f : E → F such that α(y) = α(f−1(y)) for every y ∈ F and every state α ∈ Ω(A).
Recall that a probabilistic model A is unital if every outcome x ∈ X(A) has probability one in at least one
state, i.e., there is at least one state α ∈ Ω(A) with α(x) = 1.
Theorem 3.4 Let A be a unital model in which every pair of tests has a common refinement. Then A has
a classical embedding.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Conversely, of course, if A has a classical embedding, then M(A) embeds in a test space D(S,Σ), in which
every pair of tests has a common refinement. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for a unital model
A to have a classical embedding is that it be possible to embed A in a model B in which every pair of tests
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has a common refinement. To this extent, one might reasonably say that it is the existence (or at least, the
mathematical possibility) of joint measurements that is the hallmark of “classical” probabilistic theories.
However, it is very important to note again at this point, that this is an entirely contingent feature of
classical probability theory. That is, there is no “law of thought” that tells us that any two measurements
or experiments can be performed jointly.
3.2 Classical Extensions
An embedding is not the only way of explaining one mathematical object in terms of another. One can
also consider representing the object to be explained as a quotient of a more familiar object. In connection
with probabilistic models, this line of thinking was explored by Holevo [15] and, slightly later, by Bugajsky
and Beltrametti ([6]; see also [8, 14].) In the literature, this sort of representation of a quantum model
is usually called a classical extension. The basic idea is that any convex set can arise as a quotient of
another under an affine surjection. As a simple example, a square can arise as the projection of a regular
tetrahedron (a 4-simplex) on a plane.
To develop this idea further, we will need a bit of background on Choquet theory [1]. Recall that the
σ-field of Baire sets of a compact Hausdorff space S is the smallest σ-algebra containing all sets of the form
f−1(0) where f ranges over continuous real-valued functions on S. Let K be a compact convex set, that
is, a compact, convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space V , and let ∆o(K) be the set of
Baire probability measures thereon. This is an infinite-dimensional simplex in the sense that V(∆o(K)) is
a vector lattice [1]. For each µ ∈ ∆(K), define the barycenter of µ, µ̂ ∈ V ∗∗, by
µ̂(f) =
∫
K
fdµ
for all functionals f ∈ V ∗. Using the Hahn-Banach Theorem, one can show that µ̂ ∈ K ([1], I.2.1). Thus,
we have an affine mapping µ 7→ µ̂ from ∆o(K) to K. The barycenter of the point-mass δα at α ∈ K is
evidently α, so this mapping is surjective. In this sense, every compact convex set is the image of a simplex
under an affine mapping.
Definition 3.5 (Classical extensions) A classical extension of a probabilistic model A consists of a
measurable space (S,Σ) and an affine surjection q : ∆σ(S,Σ)→ Ω(A).
This makes no reference toM(A). However, the affine surjection q : ∆o(S)→ Ω(A) can be dualized to yield
a mapping q∗ : X(A) → Aff(∆o(S)) taking every outcome x ∈ X(A) to the functional q∗(x)(µ) = µ̂(x),
which is evidently an effect on ∆(S). Now, such an effect can be understood as a “unsharp” version of
an indicator function, as discussed in Example 2.12(a) Accordingly, since
∑
x∈E q
∗(x) is identically 1, q∗
is an effect-valued weight on M(A), representing each test as a partition of 1 by such fuzzy indicator
functions, that is, q∗(E) is a (discrete) “unsharp random variable” on S. For more on this, see [2]. In
such a representation, in other words, the state space is essentially classical (it’s simply a set of probability
measures), while outcomes and tests become “unsharp”. While this may represent a slight extension of
the apparatus of standard, Kolmogorovian probability theory, it is certainly within the scope of classical
probability theory in the somewhat wider sense that concerns us here.
Another way to put all this is that a classical extension comes along with (and determines) an interpretation
M(A)→Mo(∆(S,Σ)), where the latter is the space of ordered tests on ∆(S,Σ), in the sense of Definition
2.13. This then gives us an interpretation of models A→ (Mo(∆(S,Σ)),∆(S,Σ)). In this sense, a classical
extension is an “unsharp” version of a classical embedding. However, as the discusssion above shows, every
probabilistic model has a canonical classical extension obtained by taking S = Ω(A) and Σ the Baire
field of Ω. This construction is even functorial, since the construction A 7→ Ω(A) is (the object part
of) a contravariant functor from the category of probabilistic models to the category of compact convex
sets, while K 7→ ∆0(K) and K 7→Mo(K) are, respectively, a covariant endofunctor on the category of
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compact convex sets and continuous affine maps, and from this category to the category of test spaces
and interpretations. Putting these together gives us a covariant functor A 7→ (Mo(∆0(Ω(A))),∆0(Ω(A)))
from arbitrary (locally finite) probabilistic models to unsharp Kolmogorovian models.
One can also construct a classical extension in which the carrier space is the set Kext of extreme points
of K. This need not be a Borel subset of K; however, it becomes a measurable space if we let Σext be
the trace of K’s Baire field Σo on Kext, i.e., Σext = { b ∩Kext | b ∈ Σ }. If µ is a probability measure
on Σext, then we can pull this back along the boolean homomorphism φ : b 7→ b ∩Kext to a probability
measure µ ◦φ on Σo, the barycenter of which, as defined above, defines a barycenter for µ; that is, we take
µ̂ := µ̂ ◦ φ. The Bishop-deLeeuw Theorem (see [1], I.4.14) asserts that every point of K can be represented
as the barycenter of a σ-additive probability measure on Σext.
We can regard probability measures µ in the simplex ∆(S), S = Ω(A)ext, as representing ensembles of
pure states, that is, preparation procedures that produce a particular range of pure states, with prescribed
probabilities. The quotient map ∆(S)→ Ω(A) simply takes each such ensemble to its probability-weighted
average. Where Ω(A) is not a simplex, many different ensembles will yield this same average; operationally,
that is, using the measurements available in M(A), distinct ensembles averaging to the same state are
indistinguishable, so treating a state α ∈ Ω(A) as “really” arising from one, rather than another, such
ensemble represents a kind of contextuality, what Spekkens [23] calls preparation contextuality.
3.3 Semiclassical Covers
Recall from Section 2.1 that the semiclassical cover, M˜, of a test space M is given by
M˜ = { E˜ |E ∈M },
where, for E ∈M, E˜ = {(x,E)|x ∈ E}. The outcome-set of M˜ is thus X˜ = {(x,E)|x ∈ E ∈M}, i.e.,
the coproduct of the tests E ∈M. There is an obvious outcome-preserving interpretation pi : M˜ →M,
given by pi(x,E) = {x}. Any probability weight α on M pulls back along this to a probability weight
α˜ := pi∗(α) on M˜, given by α˜(x,E) := α(x) for all x ∈ E ∈M(A). Given a model A, we define the
semiclassical cover of A to be the model A˜ := (M˜(A), Ω˜(A)}, where M˜(A) is the semiclassical cover of
M(A) and Ω˜(A) := { α˜ | α ∈ Ω }. The mapping α 7→ α˜ is an affine injection, so Ω˜(A) is isomorphic to
Ω(A). Thus, A˜ differs from A only in the structure (or the comparative lack of structure) of its test space.
Since M˜(A) is semiclassical, its space Pr(M˜) of probability weights is essentially the Cartesian product
ΠE∈M∆(E) of the finite-dimensional simplices ∆(E) of probability weights on the various tests E ∈M.
Indeed, we can represent α ∈ Pr(M˜(A)) uniquely as (αE) where αE is α’s restriction to E ∈ M(A).
Hence, M˜ supports a wealth of dispersion-free probability weights, namely, those weights obtained by
selecting a dispersion-free probability weight — a point-mass — from each simplex ∆(E).
In what follows, I’ll write S(A) for the set of all such dispersion-free states on M˜(A). It is easy to show
that these are exactly the extreme probability weights on M˜(A), and that S(A) is closed in Pr(M˜(A))
(see Appendix B). This allows us to represent every α ∈ Pr(M˜) as the barycenter of a Borel probability
measure on S(A) (as every Baire probability measure on a compact space has a unique Borel extension).
Letting ∆(S(A)) denote the simplex of Borel probability measures on S(A), this gives us an affine surjection
φ : ∆(S(A)) → Pr(M˜(A)). Also, ψ : (x,E) 7→ {α ∈ S|α(x,E) = 1} gives an interpretation of each test
E˜ ∈ M˜(A) as an element of D(S,Σ), where Σ is the Borel algebra of S(A), and it is straightforward that
φ = ψ∗. We therefore have the following picture:
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D(S(A),Σ)
M(A) M˜(A)pi
ψ
∆(S(A))
Ω(A) Pr(M˜(A))
φ = ψ∗
pi∗
The dual mapping pi∗(α)(x,E) = α(x) is injective, while ψ∗ is surjective: again, Ω(A) is a convex subset
of a quotient of a simplex. However, in this representation observables associated with tests E ∈M(A)
correspond to sharp classical random variables on S(A): letting a˜x = {s ∈ S(A)|s(x,E) = 1}, {ax|x ∈ E}
is a partition of S(A˜).
This gives us a very simple representation of an arbitrary model as a quotient of a sub-model of Kol-
mogorovian model. To the extent that a representation of a model A as a quotient of a model B allows
us to “explain” the model A in terms of the model B, and to the extent that representing a model B as a
submodel of a model C also allows us to explain B in terms of C, then — to the extent that “explains” is
transitive — we see that every model can be explained in terms of a classical one. This construction is even
functorial: if φ : A→ B is an interpretation from a model A to a model B, there is a canonical extension
of φ to an interpretation φ˜ : A˜→ B˜, given by φ(x,E) = (φ(x), φ(E)). Hence, an entire probabilistic theory
can be rendered essentially classical, if we are willing to embrace contextuality.
Hidden Variables This is as good a place as any to clarify how the foregoing discussion connects to
traditional notions of “hidden varibles” (or “ontological representations” [23]). Briefly, a (not necessarily
deterministic, not necessarily contextual) hidden variables representation of a probabilistic model A consists
of a measurable space Λ and, for every test E ∈M, a conditional probability distribution p( · |λ,E) on
E — that is, p(x|λ,E) is a non-negative real number for each x ∈ E, and ∑x∈E p( x | λ,E ) = 1. It is
also required that, for every state α ∈ Ω(A), there exist a probability measure µ on Λ such that for every
x ∈ X(A) and every test E with x ∈ E,∫
Λ
p(x|λ,E)dµ(λ) = α(x). (1)
Now, if we rewrite p(x|λ,E) as pλ(x,E), we see that pλ is simply a probability weight on M˜(A). We can
then write (1) as
α(x) =
(∫
Λ
pλdµ(λ)
)
(x,E) (2)
which merely asserts that α is the µ-weighted average of a family of probability weights on M˜(A),
parametrized by Λ.
3.4 Discussion
In view of the classical representations discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3, it seems that we can always
understand a “generalized probabilistic model”, or, indeed, a generalized probababilistic theory, in terms
of a classical model or theory. The only departure from classical Kolmogorovian probability theory, in these
representations, is a restriction — which one can regard as epistemic or as “physical”, as the case warrants
— on which ensembles of probability measures one can prepare, which (classical) measurements one can
perform, and hence, on which measurement outcomes and which mixtures of states one can distinguish. To
be sure, we are under no obligation to take ensembles in ∆(Ωext) or dispersion-free states on M˜ seriously
as part of any given physical theory, and we may also prefer to do without them for reasons of mathematical
economy; but both are mathematically meaningful, and certainly have a place in any developed general
probability theory. To this extent, arbitrary probabilistic models, and even probabilistic theories, have
fairly canonical “explanations” in Kolmogorovian terms.
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In the next section I will go just a step further and point out that, for models with certain strong symmetry
properties (including quantum models), there is available a rather different kind of “classical” represen-
tation: one in which the model’s probabilistic apparatus is entirely classical — there is, in fact, only one
basic measurement. In such a representation it is, rather, the interplay between a system’s symmetries, its
states, and this perfectly classical probabilistic apparatus, that is (in a sense I try to pin down) perhaps
not quite “classical”.
4 Dynamical Models and Dynamical States
One of the things that most conspicuously distinguishes quantum probabilistic models from more general
ones is the their very high degree of symmetry: given any two pure quantum states, there is a unitary
operator taking one to the other, and likewise, given any two projective orthonormal bases, there is a
unitary operator taking one to the other. In this section, I want to sketch a different kind of classical
representation, available for locally finite models whenever such a great deal of symmetry is in play. This
is mathematially similar to the representation in terms of the semiclassical cover; conceptually, however,
it is leaner, in that it privileges a single observable, and encodes the structure of the model in the ways in
which probabilities on this observable can change.
4.1 Models with Symmetry
In this section, we will consider probabilistic models A that, in addition to the test space M(A) and state
space Ω(A), are equipped with a distinguished symmetry group G(A) acting on X(A), M(A) and Ω(A).
In most applications, G(A) will be a lie group and, in our finite dimensional setting, compact.
Definition 4.1 (Symmetries of test spaces) a symmetry of a test space M with outcome-set X =⋃M is an isomorphism g : M → M, or, equivalently, a bijection g : X → X such that ∀E ⊆ X,
g(E) ∈M iff E ∈M. We write Aut(M) for the group of all symmetries of M under composition.
Note that Aut(M) also has a natural right action on Pr(M), since if g ∈ Aut(M) and α ∈ Pr(M), then
α◦g is again a probability weight, and the mapping g∗ : α 7→ α◦g is an affine bijection Pr(M)→ Pr(M).
Definition 4.2 (Dynamical models) A dynamical probabilistic model is a probabilistic model A with a
distinguished dynamical group G(A) ≤ Aut(M(A)) under which Ω(A) is invariant [4].
I use the terms dynamical model and dynamical group because in situations in which G(A) is a Lie group,
a reversible dynamics for (or consistent with) the model will be a choice of a continuous one-parameter
group g ∈ Hom(R, G(A)), that is, a mapping t 7→ gt with gt+s = gtgs, which we interpret at tracking the
system’s evolution over time: if α is the state at some initial time, gt(α) = α ◦ g−t is the state after the
elapse of t units of time. That g is a homomorphism encodes a Markovian assumption about the dynamics,
namely, that a system’s later state depends only on its initial state and the amount of time that has passed,
rather than on the system’s entire history.
Definition 4.3 (Symmetric and fully symmetric models) A dynamical probabilistic modelA is sym-
metric iff G(A) acts transitively on the set M(A) of tests, and the stabilizer, G(A)E , of a (hence, any)
test E ∈M acts transitively on E. Note that this implies that all tests have a common size. We say that
A is fully symmetric iff, additionally, for any test E ∈M(A) and any permutation σ : E → E, there exists
at least one g ∈ G(A) with gx = σ(x) for every x ∈ E.
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An equivalent way to express full symmetry is to say that all tests E,F ∈M(A) have the same cardinality,
and, for every bijection f : E → F , there exists some g ∈ G(A) with gx = f(x) for every x ∈ E.
The quantum probabilistic model A(H) is fully symmetric under the unitary group U(H), since any
bijection between two (projective) orthonormal bases for H extends to a unitary operator.
We can reconstruct a symmetric test space M(A) from any one of its tests, plus information about its
symmetries [27]. Suppose we are given, in addition to the group G(A), a single test E ∈M(A), an outcome
xo ∈ E, and the two subgroups
H := { g ∈ G(A) | gE = E } and K := { g ∈ G(A) | gxo = xo }.
We then have a canonical bijection G(A)/K → X(A), sending gK to gxo, and sending {hK|h ∈ H}
bijectively onto E; M(A) can then be recovered as the orbit of E in X(A). Thus, more abstractly, one
could start with a triple (G,H,K) where G is a group and H,K are subgroups of G, define X := G/K
and E = {hK|h ∈ H}, and set M = {gE|g ∈ G}. If H acts as the full permutation group on E, M will
be fully symmetric under G. The choice of a closed convex set Ω ⊆ Pr(M), invariant under G, completes
the picture and gives us a G-symmmetric probabilistic model.
The simplest cases are those in which H is a subgroup of S(E), the group of permutations of E. This holds
for ordinary quantum test spaces, since every permutation of an orthonormal basis determines a unique
unitary. In what follows, we concentrate on this case. (For a projective quantum test space, in which E is
a maximal set of pairwise orthogonal rank-one projections, H is generated by permutation matrices acting
on E, plus unitaries commuting with these projections.)
4.2 A Representation in terms of dynamical states
We now reformulate these ideas in a way that gives more prominence to the chosen test E ∈M(A). In
brief: if we hold the test E fixed, but retain control over both the state space Ω(A) and the dynamical
group G(A), we obtain a mathematically equivalent picture of the model, but one in which the probabilistic
structure is, from a certain point of view, essentially classical.
Consider the following situation: one has some laboratory apparatus, defining an experiment with outcome-
set E. This is somehow coupled to a physical system having a state-space Ω, governed by a Lie group G.
That is, G acts on Ω in such a way that all possible evolutions of this system are described by an initial
state αo ∈ Ω and a one-parameter subgroup (gt)t∈R of G. It is harmless, and will be convenient, to take Ω
to be a right G-space, that is, to denote the image of state α ∈ Ω under the action of g ∈ G by αg. We may
suppose that the way in which the apparatus is coupled with the system manifests itself probabilistically,
by a function
p : Ω× E → [0, 1]
giving the probability p(α, x) to obtain outcome x ∈ E when the system is in state α.7 I will assume in
what follows that the probability weights p(α, ·) separate outcomes in E, that is, that for all outcomes
x, y ∈ E,
( ∀α ∈ Ω p(α, x) = p(α, y) ) ⇒ x = y. (3)
(If not, we can factor out the obvious equivalence relation on E.) I will also suppose that the experiment E
and the group G together separate states, that is, knowing how the probabilities p(αg, x) vary with g ∈ G,
for all outcomes x ∈ E, is enough to determine the state α uniquely. In other words,
( ∀g ∈ G,∀x ∈ E p(αg, x) = p(βg, x) ) ⇒ α = β (4)
7I prefer to write this as p(α, x) rather than as p(x|α) in order to make the covariance conditions below come out more
prettily.
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Notice that for each state α ∈ Ω, we can define a mapping α̂ : G → ∆(E), where ∆(E) is the simplex of
probability weights on E, given by
α̂(g)(x) = p(αg, x).
Alternatively, we can treat α̂ as a mapping G × E → [0, 1] with ∑x∈E α̂(g, x) = 1, by writing α̂(g, x) :=
α̂(g)(x). I will leave it to context to determine which of these representations is intended. In either case, I
will refer to α̂ as the dynamical state associated with state α ∈ Ω. The state-separation condition (4) tells
us that α 7→ α̂ ∈ ∆(E)G is injective, so if we wish, we can identify states with the corresponding dynamical
states.
The mapping α̂ ∈ ∆(E)G is a (discrete) random probability measure on G, while α̂ : G × E → [0, 1] is a
discrete Markov kernel on G×E. Thus, nothing we have done so far takes us outside the range of classical
probability theory. In fact, if G is compact, that there is a natural measure on G×E, namely the product
of the normalized Haar measure on G and the counting measure on E, such that∫
G×E
α̂(g, x)d(g, x) =
∫
G
(∑
x∈E
α̂(g, x)
)
dg =
∫
G
1dg = 1.
In other words, for each state α ∈ Ω, α̂(g, x) defines a probability density on G × E. Moreover, as∑
x∈E α̂(g, x) = 1, the conditional density α̂(x|g) is exactly α̂(g) ∈ ∆(E). Nevertheless, any symmetric
probabilistic model provides an example of this scenario: simply chose a test E ∈M(A), and let p(α, x) =
α(x) and α̂(g)(x) = α(gx) for all α ∈ Ω(A) and any x ∈ E. Conversely, as we will see, one can reconstruct
a symmetric probabilistic model A with E ∈M(A) and Ω ' Ω(A) from the “classical” data described
above, that is, the test E, the state space Ω, the symmetry group G and the probabilistic coupling p.
Definition 4.4 (Implementing a permutation) Let E, Ω, G and p be as above, and let σ be a per-
mutation of the outcome-set E. Then we shall say that g ∈ G implements σ iff p(αg, x) = p(α, σx) for all
α ∈ Ω and all x ∈ E.
Our outcome-separation assumption (3) implies that if p(α, σx) = p(α, τx) for all α ∈ Ω and all x ∈ E,
then σx = τx, i.e., σ = τ . Thus, if g ∈ G implements a permtutation σ ∈ S(E), it implements only one
such permutation, which we may denote by σg.
Lemma 4.5 Let H be the set of all group elements g ∈ G implementing permutations of E. Then H is a
subgroup of G and σ : H→ S(E), g 7→ σg, is a homomorphism.
Proof: Let g, h ∈ H. Then for all α ∈ Ω and all x ∈ E, we have
p(αgh, x) = p(αg, σhx) = p(α, σgσhx).
Hence, gh ∈ H with σgh = σgσh. We also have
p(αg−1, x) = p(αg−1, σgσ−1g x) = p(αg
−1g, σ−1g x) = p(α, σ
−1x)
so g−1 ∈ H. 
Thus, E carries a natural H action. In what follows, I will simplify the notation by writing hx for σhx,
where h ∈ H and x ∈ E. It is natural to consider cases in which E is transitive as an H-set, meaning that
for every x, y ∈ E, there exits at least one h ∈ H with hx = y. This motivates the following
Definition 4.6 (Dynamical classical models) A dynamical classical model (DCM) consists of groups
H ≤ G, a transtive left H-set E, a convex right G-space Ω, and a Markov kernel p : Ω × E → [0, 1] such
that p(α, hx) = p(αh, x) for all α ∈ Ω, h ∈ H and x ∈ E.
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Given a DCM as defined above, for each state α ∈ Ω define α̂ : G→ ∆(E) by
α̂(g)(x) = p(αg, x).
We shall say that a DCM is state-determining iff α 7→ α̂ is injective, i.e., the probability weights α̂(g)
on ∆(E), as g ranges over G, determine the state α. Henceforth, I will assume that all DCMs are state-
determining.
Any DCM can be reinterpreted as a symmetric dynamical probabilistic model in a routine way, which we
shall now describe. With notation as in Definition 4.6, let xo ∈ E and set
K := { g ∈ G | p(αg, xo) = p(α, xo) ∀α ∈ Ω }.
Arguing in much the same way as above, it is easy to see that K, too, is a subgroup of G. The following
slightly extends a result from [26]; see also [27]:
Theorem 4.7 Let E be a set acted upon transitively by a group H, let G be any group with H ≤ G, and
let K be any subgroup of G with K ≤ K and K ∩ H = Hxo . Then there is a well-defined H-equivariant
injection φ : E → X given by φ(hxo) = hK for all h ∈ H. Identifying E with φ(E) ⊆ X,
(a) M := { gφ(E) | g ∈ G } is a fully G-symmetric test space, and
(b) For every α ∈ Ω,
˜α(xg) := α(g, xo)
is a well-defined probability weight on M; and
(c) The mapping α 7→ ˜α is a G-equivariant affine injection.
The proof is given in Appendix C.
Thus, the essentially classical picture presented above — a single test (or observable) E, interacting
probabilistically with a system with a state-space Ω and symmetry group G by means of the function
p : Ω × E → [0, 1] — can be reinterpreted as a “non-classical” probabilistic model in which E appears as
one of many possible tests, provided that a sufficiently large set of permutations of E can be implemented
physically by the group G. What is more important for our purposes, however, is the (even more) trivial
converse: Any symmetric model A, and in particular, any (finite-dimensional) quantum model, arises from
this construction: simply take H to be the stabilizer in G(A) of a chosen test E ∈M(A) and K to be the
stabilizer in G(A) of some chosen outcome xo ∈ E, and we recover (M(A),Ω(A)) from Theorem 4.7.
To summarize: in the representation above, we have reinterpreted the states as, in effect, random probability
measures (or rather, weights) on a fixed test E, indexed by the dynamical group G(A). Another way to view
this is that each state determines a family of trajectories in the simplex ∆(E) of classical probability weights
on E. Given a state α ∈ Ω plus the system’s actual dynamics, as specified by a choice of one-parameter
group g : R→ G(A), we obtain a path α̂t := α̂(gt) in ∆(E). In this representation, notice,
(a) States are not viewed as probability weights on a non-classical test space, but rather, specify how
classical probabilities change over time, given the dynamics.
(b) In general, the trajectories in ∆(E) arising from states and one-parameter subgroups of G(A) are not
governed by flows, that is, there is no one-parameter group of affine mappings T s : ∆(E) → ∆(E)
such that α̂t+s = T
s(αt). In particular, the observed evolution of probabilities on E is not Markov.
In this respect, it is the dynamical, rather than the probabilistic, structure of the DCM that can be
regarded as non-classical.
It is also important to note that the representation of a symmetric probabilistic model as a DCM is not
in any usual sense a “hidden variables” representation: it invokes no additional structure, but is simply a
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different, and mathematically equivalent, way of viewing the model (in particular, its states) — one that,
I am urging, we might nevertheless want to to count as probabilistically “classical”: to whatever extent it
departs from classicality, it does so with respect to its dynamical, and not with respect to its probabilistic,
structure.
5 Composite models, entanglement and locality
Thus far, we have been discussing probabilistic models largely in isolation, and largely in abstraction from
physics. Once we start to consider probabilistic models in relation to one another, and as representing
actual physical systems localized in spacetime, e.g., particles (or laboratories), we encounter a host of new
questions regarding compound systems in which two or more component systems occupy causally separate
regions of spacetime. In particular, we unavoidably encounter the concepts of entanglement and locality.
In this section, I briefly review how these notions unfold in the context of general probabilistic theories (fol-
lowing [4, 12]), and how the various classical representations discussed above interact with such composites.
As we’ll see, entangled states arise naturally in this context. There is a sense in which the representations
in terms of classical extensions and in terms of semiclassical covers are both obviously non-local, simply
because in each case the “classical” state spaces associated with a composite system AB is typically much
larger than the Cartesian product of those associated with A and B separately. Thus, for instance, if S(A)
stands for the set of dispersion-free probability weights on M˜(A), then S(AB) is generally much larger
than S(A)× S(B). Similarly, unless Ω(A) or Ω(B) is a simplex, Ω(AB) will generally allow for entangled
pure states, which essentially just means that Ω(AB)ext will be larger than Ω(A)ext × Ω(B)ext. A more
technical notion of “non-locality” in terms of hidden variables is discussed below in subsection 5.2, while
the more delicate question of whether composites of DCMs should be regarded as local or not is discussed
in section 5.4.
5.1 Composites of probabilistic models
Suppose A and B are probabilistic models. A joint probability weight on the test spaces M(A) and M(B)
is a function ω : X(A)×X(B)→ [0, 1] that sums to 1 on each product test E × F , where E ∈M(A) and
F ∈M(B). Joint probability weights can be understood as probability weights on the test space
M(A)×M(B) := { E × F | E ∈M(A), F ∈M(B) }
consisting of all product tests. If α and β are probability weights on A and B, we can form a joint probability
weight α ⊗ β on A and B, by the obvious recipe (α ⊗ β)(x, y) = α(x)β(y) for outcomes x ∈ X(A) and
y ∈ X(B).
Definition 5.1 (Non-signaling joint probability weights) A joint probability weight ω on M(A)
and M(B) is non-signaling iff its marginal (or reduced) probability weights, given by
ω2(y) := ω(E × {y}) and ω1(x) := ω({x} × F )
are well-defined, i.e., independent of the choice of E ∈M(A) and F ∈M(B), respectively.
To the extent to which we think of the tests E ∈M(A) as representing the physical actions performable on
the system represented by A (in the sense that to perform a test is to do something to the system, and then
observe a result), and similarly for B, the non-signaling condition on ω tells us that no action performable
on A can have any statistically detectable influence on B, and vice versa. Thus, the no-signaling condition
is the locality condition appropriate to states qua probability weights.
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A non-signaling joint probability weight, having well-defined marginals, also has well-defined conditional
probability weights given by
ω2|x(y) :=
ω(x, y)
ω2(y)
and ω1|y(x) :=
ω(x, y)
ω1(x)
(with, say, the convention that both are zero if their denominators are). The marginal states can be
recovered as convex combinations of these conditional states, in a version of the law of total probability:
ω1 =
∑
y∈F
ω2(y)ω1|y and ω2 =
∑
x∈E
ω1(x)ω2|x.
We would certainly want these conditional and (hence) marginal states to belong to the designated state-
spaces of each component of a reasonable composite model.
Definition 5.2 Given probabilistic models A and B, let A ⊗ B denote the probabilistic model with test
space M(A⊗B) :=M(A)×M(B) and state-space Ω(A⊗B) consisting of all non-signaling joint states
ω on M(A)×M(B) having conditional (and hence, marginal) states belonging to Ω(A) and Ω(B).
This is essentially the maximal (or injective) tensor product of Ω(A) and Ω(B) [4, 20]. Since it does not
allow for non-product outcomes, it is too small to be generally useful as a model of composite systems, but
it does afford an easy way to define something more general:
Definition 5.3 (Non-signaling composites [4]) A non-signaling composite of probabilistic models A
and B is a model AB, together with
(a) an outcome-preserving interpretation φ : A ⊗ B → AB, taking each pair of outcomes x ∈
X(A) and y ∈ X(B) to a product outcome xy := φ(x, y) 8 , and
(b) a bi-affine mapping Ω(A) × Ω(B) → Ω(AB) taking states α ∈ Ω(A) and β ∈ Ω(B) to a
product state α⊗ β such that (α⊗ β)(xy) = α(x)β(y) for all x ∈ X(A), y ∈ X(B).
Henceforth, by a composite of two probabilistic models, I will always mean a non-signaling composite in
this sense.
Example 5.4 Consider quantum probabilistic models A(H) and A(K). If we take AB to be A(H⊗K),
then we have a natural map φ : X(H)×X(K)→ X(H⊗K), given by φ(x, y) = x⊗ y. It is easy to check
that this is an interpretation from A(H)×A(K). We also have an affine mapping Ω(H)×Ω(K)→ Ω(H⊗K)
given by (αT , αW ) 7→ αT⊗W (where, recall, αT represents the probability weight determined by the density
operator T ). It is easy to see that these mappings satisfy the conditions above.
If AB is a composite of models A and B as in definition 5.3, every state ω ∈ Ω(AB) pulls back along the
designated interpretation φ : A⊗B → AB to a nonsignaling joint probability weight φ∗(ω)(x, y) = ω(xy)
on M(A) ×M(B) with conditional and marginal weights belonging to Ω(A) and Ω(B). In general, this
joint probability weight does not determine the state ω.
Definition 5.5 (Local tomography) A composite AB of probabilistic models A and B, with designated
interpretation φ : A⊗B → AB, is locally tomographic iff the mapping φ∗ : Ω(AB)→ Ω(A×B) is injective.
8A more general definition would drop the requirement that φ be outcome-preserving, thus allowing for the possibility
that for some outcomes x and y, φ(x, y) =: xy might be a non-trivial (and even possibly empty) event of AB. We will not
need this generality here.
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It is easy to show that, for finite-dimensional probabilistic models A and B, AB is locally tomographic
iff the mapping ⊗ : Ω(A) × Ω(B) → Ω(AB) extends to a linear isomorphism V(A) ⊗ V(B) ' V(AB).
Mathematically, then, local tomography is a great convenience. However, given its failure for real and
quaternionic QM, unless we are looking for an excuse to rule out these variants of QM (and see, e.g., [3]
for reasons why we might not want to do so), it is probably best to avoid taking local tomography as an
axiom.
It is natural to ask that a probabilistic theory be closed under some rule of composition, in the sense of
Definition 5.3, that is consonant with the theory’s categorical structure. A way to make this precise is to
ask that a probabilistic theory be a symmetric monoidal category. See [4] for further discussion.
5.2 Entanglement
If AB is a composite of models A and B, then any convex combination of product states, say
∑
i tiαi ⊗ βi
or, more generally, ∫
Λ
(αλ ⊗ βλ)dµ(λ)9
is said to be separable. Such states can (in principle) be prepared by randomly selecting product states
αλ and βλ for A and B, respectively, in a classically correlated way. States not of this form are said to
be entangled. The existence, and the basic properties, of entangled states are rather generic features of
probabilistic models having non-simplex state spaces. In particular, we have the following
Lemma 5.6 Let ω be any non-signaling state on AB. Then
(a) If α⊗ β is pure, then so are α and β;
(b) If either of the marginal states ω1 ∈ Ω(A) or ω2 ∈ Ω(B) is pure, then ω = ω1 ⊗ ω2;
(c) Hence, if ω is entangled, then ω1 and ω2 are mixed.
Proof: See [4] (and note that the arguments are virtually identical to the familiar ones in the context of
QM).10
When A and B are semiclassical, the test space M(A⊗B) of Defintion 5.2 is again semiclassical. In this
situation, we have lots of dispersion-free joint states. However:
Lemma 5.7 Let A and B be models with semiclassical test spaces M(A) and M(B), and let ω ∈
Pr(M(A×B)). If ω is non-signaling and dispersion-free, then ω = δ⊗γ where δ and γ are dispersion-free.
Proof: Suppose ω is dispersion-free. Since ω is also non-signaling, it has well-defined marginal states, which
must obviously also be dispersion-free, hence, pure. But by Lemma 5.6, a non-signaling state with pure
marginals is the product of these marginals. 
It follows that any average of non-signaling, dispersion-free states is separable.
9where Λ is a measurable space and µ is a probability measure thereon, and where the integral exists in the obvious sense
that (∫
Λ
αλ ⊗ βλ)dµ(λ)
)
(z) =
∫
Λ
(αλ ⊗ βλ)(z)dµ(λ)
10As an historical note, both of these points were first noted in this generality, but without any reference to entanglement,
in a pioneering paper of Namioka and Phelps [20] on tensor products of compact convex sets. They were rediscovered, and
connected with entanglement, by Kla¨y [17].
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5.3 Locality and hidden variables
In the literature, a (contextual) local hidden variable model for a bipartite probability weight ω is usually
taken to consist of a measurable space Λ, a probability measure µ thereon, and a pair of response functions
pA and pB such that, such that for all tests E ∈ M(A), F ∈ M(B) and all outcomes x ∈ E and
y ∈ F ∈M(B), p(x|E, λ) is the probability of x given the parameter λ and the choice of measurement E,
and similarly for p(y|F, λ). These are required to satisfy
ω(x, y) =
∫
Λ
pA(x|E, λ)p(y|F, λ)dµ(λ)
so that we can interpret the joint probability ω(x, y) as resulting from a classical correlation (given by µ)
together with the local response functions pA and pB .
As discussed in section 3.3, it is straightforward to reinterpret the functions pA and pB in terms of prob-
ability weights on M˜(A) and M˜(B), respectively, by writing pA(x|E, λ) as pA,λ(x,E) and pB(y|F, λ) as
pB,λ(y, F ) (emphasizing that λ can be treated as merely an index). We then have
ω(x, y) =
(∫
Λ
pA,λ ⊗ pB,λdµ(λ)
)
((x,E), (y, F )),
independently of E and F . In other words, ω has a local HV model if, and only if, it is separable, in the
integral sense, when regarded as a joint probability weight on M˜(A ⊗ B), where A ⊗ B is the composite
of Definition 5.2.
Remark: A first reaction to this observation might be that it must be wrong, as it’s well-known that there
exist entangled Werner states that nevertheless have local HV representations [25]. The subtlety here
(such as it is) resides in the fact that whether a state is separable or entangled depends on what “local”
state-spaces are in play. Here, we are expressing ω as a weighted average of products of “contextual” states,
whereas in standard discussions of quantum entanglement, a state is separable iff it can be expressed as a
weighted average of products of quantum (in particular, non-contextual) states of the component systems.
5.4 Composites of dynamical models
Since dynamical classical models are simply another way of looking at symmetric probabilistic models, in
principle they can be composed in the same way as the latter. I have discussed this in some technical
detail elsewhere [27]. Without going into such detail, I want to make a few remarks on the sense in which
composites of DCMs can be regarded as local. Suppose, then, that
A = (Ω(A), G(A), H(A), E(A), pA) and B = (Ω(B), G(B), H(B), E(B), pB)
are two DCMs as defined in Section 4.2, and suppose that AB is a DCM serving as a composite of these.
This will require, at a minimum, that E(AB) = E(A)× E(B), and that we have functions
⊗ : Ω(A)× Ω(B)→ Ω(AB) and ⊗ : G(A)×G(B)→ G(AB)
with the former bi-affine and the latter a group homomorphism, such that (G(A) ⊗ G(B)) ∩ H(AB) ≤
H(A)⊗H(B) and
(α⊗ β)(g ⊗ h) = αg ⊗ βh
for all (α, β) ∈ Ω(A)× Ω(B) and all (g, h) ∈ G(A)×G(B). Additional conditions are necessary to ensure
that a non-signaling condition is satisfied, but this is enough for present purposes.
Examples 5.8 (a) By the minimal classical dynamical model associated with a finite set E, I mean the
DCM A(E) with Ω(A(E)) = ∆(E), G(A(E)) = H(A(E)) = S(E) (the symmetric group of all bijections
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E → E) and pA(E)(α, x) = α(x). Now given two finite sets, then the minimal DCM A(E×F ) is a composite
of A(E) and A(F ) with the maps ⊗ : ∆(E) ×∆(F ) → ∆(E × F ) and ⊗S(E) ×S(F ) → S(E × F ) the
obvious ones, that is,
(α⊗ β)(x, y) = α(x)β(y) and (g, h)(x, y) = (gx, hy)
for all (x, y) ∈ E × F , (α, β) ∈ ∆(E)×∆(F ) and (g, h) ∈ S(E)×S(F ).
(b) Let A and B be quantum-mechanical systems associated with Hilbert spaces HA and HB . Fixing
orthonormal bases E ∈M(HA) and F ∈M(HB), we can regard A and B as DCMs with Ω(A) and Ω(B)
the spaces of density operators on HA and HB , respectively, G(A) = U(HA) and G(B) = U(HB), and
with
pA(W,x) = Tr(Wpx) = 〈Wx, x〉
and similarly for pB . Identifying E×F with the product basis E⊗F in M(HA⊗HB), we can regard the
quantum system associated with HA ⊗HB as a DCM in the same way. In this case the maps ⊗ referred
to above are the obvious ones: given unitaries U ∈ U(HA) and V ∈ U(HB), we have a untary U ⊗ V on
HA ⊗HB , and if WA and WB are density operators on HA and HB respectively, the WA ⊗WB is the
corresponding density operator on HA ⊗HB .
As discussed above, the prevailing technical definition of a local probabilistic theory is one in which com-
posite systems admit local hidden-variable models (ideally, in a functorial way, though this point is rarely
discussed). More generally, one would like to say that a probabilistic theory is local iff composite sys-
tems admit “local” classical representations, in some well-defined (but reasonably general) sense. As I’ve
mentioned, the classical extensions and the classical representations associated with semiclassical covers,
discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, are certainly not local in any reasonable sense. What about composites
of DCMs? In what sense are, or aren’t, these to be regarded as local classical representations of symmetric
probabilistic models? As Example 5.4 and the second example above illustrate, the state space Ω(AB)
will in general be significantly larger than the convex hull of Ω(A) × Ω(B), in the sense that there will
be entangled states. In this weak sense, such a composite will generally be “non-local”. On the other
hand, it is not entirely clear how to discuss the locality of a composite of dynamical classical models as a
classical representation, since it involves only a single, classical measurement E(A)×E(B), and invokes no
hidden variables, non-local or otherwise — unless, of course, we wish to regard the symmetries in G(AB)
as “hidden variables”. In that case, the “non-locality” presumably rests in the fact that the group G(AB)
will typically be a great deal larger than G(A)×G(B). This is true, of course, for quantum models, where
the unitary group U(HA ⊗HB) is larger than U(HA)⊗ U(HB). But it is also true for minimal classical
dynamical models, since for sets E and F , the symmetric group S(E × F ) is larger than S(E)×S(F ).
6 Conclusion
Many of the observations collected above are well known, at least folklorically. My aim in bringing them
together, in the particular way that I have, has been to draw attention to some points that I believe follow
from these observations collectively, and that I believe are somewhat less widely appreciated than they
might be:
(a) Classicality in the strict (that is, unrestricted) Kolmogorovian sense, is manifestly a contingent mat-
ter, since it is not a point of logical necessity that all experiments should be compatible. To the
extent that probability theory is meant to be a completely general and a priori study of reasoning in
the face of uncertainty or chance, it isn’t Kolmogorovian, nor is it quantum-mechanical: it is, rather,
the study of what I’ve here called probabilistic theories generally (whether formulated as I have done
here, or in some roughly similar way).
(b) Within such a framework, what we ought to mean by saying that a probabilistic model or probabilistic
theory is “classical” is not entirely obvious. For some values of “classical”, every probabilistic theory
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is, or can be represented as, a classical one, at the cost of contextuality and, where we are dealing
with a non-signaling theory, also of locality. Moreover, for certain kinds of theories (fully symmetric
ones), there is a broad sense of “classical” in which such a theory simply is classical, without any
need to invoke hidden variables, contextual, non-local or otherwise. Or at least, this is true for the
theory’s probabilistic structure: any departure from “classicality” is dynamical. Finite-dimensional
quantum mechanics is such a theory.
(c) The selection of a class of probabilistic models — a probabilistic theory — must rest on some con-
tingent assumptions about the nature of the entities one seeks to model. Quantum mechanics, as a
probabilistic theory, is contingent in this way; so is (unrestricted, Kolmogorovian) classical probabil-
ity theory, and the two are not the same. In this limited and unremarkable sense, quantum mechanics
is (of course) a non-classical probabilistic theory.
I don’t know how much, if any, of this Pitowsky would have endorsed. Regarding (b), at least, he was very
clear:
We can always avoid the radical view of probability by adopting a non-local, contextual hidden
variables theory such as Bohm’s. But then I believe, the philosophical point is missed. It is
like taking Steven Weinberg’s position on space-time in general relativity: There is no non-flat
Riemannian geometry, only a gravitational field defined on a flat space-time that appears as if
it gives rise to geometry ... I think that Weinberg’s point and also Bohm’s theory are justified
only to the extent that they yield new discoveries in physics (as Weinberg certainly hoped). So
far they haven’t.
I have no issue to take with this, as far as it goes: we are always free to reject a classical representation of
a probabilistic theory by objecting to the additional “classical” structure as “non-physical”. But I would
also want to say that doing so makes the theory a physical theory, and not a theory of probability. Or,
to put it differently, whether one wants to take, for example, a set of contextual hidden variables, or a
privileged observable, seriously in formulating a given physical theory is a pragmatic question about the
best (the most elegant, the most convenient, the most fruitful) way to formulate mathematical models of a
particular sort of physical situation. It is also (in particular!) a metaphysical question about what ontology
one wants to admit in framing such a model. Such decisions are important; but they are not decisions
about what kind of probability theory to use.
Pitowsky also says (emphasis mine):
In this paper, all we have discussed is the Hilbert space formalism. I have argued that it is
a new kind of probability theory that is quite devoid of physical content, save perhaps the
indeterminacy principle which is built into axiom H4. Within this formal context there is no
explication of what a measurement is, only the identification of “observables” as Hermitian
operators. In this respect the Hilbert space formalism is really just a syntax which represents
the set of all possible outcomes, of all possible measurements.
Here, of course, I disagree. The “syntax” of quantum probability theory is very definitely not devoid of
physical content. Reconstructions of QM from various sets of postulates, ranging from the Piron-Amemiya-
Araki-Sole`r reconstruction cited by Pitowsky (see [16]), to the various more recent finite-dimensional re-
constructions (e.g., [5, 9, 10, 19, 28]) have helped us understand the physical content of quantum theory
more clearly, by isolating operationally meaningful principles that dictate that syntax. These principles
invariably include some that are manifestly contingent, at least to the same degree that the classical
co-measurability principle is contingent.
The final lines of Pitowsky’s paper crystalize what I find problematic in his proposal. (Again, the emphasis
is mine.)
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However, there is a structure to the set of events. Not only does each and every type of measure-
ment yield a systematic outcome; but also the set of all possible outcomes of all measurements
— including those that have been realized by an actual recording — hang together tightly in
the structure of [the projection lattice] L(H). This is the quantum mechanical structure of
reality.
Taken in the context of Pitowsky’s claim that QM represents a new, non-classical theory of probability, this
suggests a certain naturalism regarding probability theory (echoing von Neumann/Birkhoff’s naturalism
regarding logic): that there is a true probability theory, which is the one that works best, and most broadly,
to describe the world we actually live in. If the world really is, at every scale and in every way, described by
some version of quantum theory, so that there just are no actual events that can’t be described as effects in
(say) some grand von Neumann algebra, then quantum probability theory is this true, correct probability
theory, of which classical probability theory is simply a limiting or special case (where ~ tends to zero, or
where we restrict attention to a set of commuting observables).
But this view seems to me misleading: not because naturalism per se is wrong (even about mathematics),
but because it forgets that probability theory has a methodological as well as a metaphysical importance:
it is not simply part of our scientific description of the world, but is part of the framework within which we
think about, criticize, and (often) revise that description. In order for it to play this role, it can not be tied to
any particular physical theory. This is why I think it is vital to maintain the distinction between probability
theory and the various probabilistic theories that it studies. There’s no such thing as a probablility theory,
classical or otherwise: there is only probability theory. There can be a correct probabilistic theory of the
world — and perhaps it’s quantum.
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A Common refinements
Let A be a probabilistic model, and let E,F ∈M(A). Recall that E refines F , or that F is a coarsening
of E, if there exists a surjection f : E → F such that, for every y ∈ F and every state α ∈ Ω,
α(y) = α(f−1(y)).
When this is so, we write E  F , and say that f is a coarsening map.
Definition A.1 A set Ω of probability weights on a test spaceM separates compatible events iff, for every
test E ∈M and any pair of distinct events a, b ⊆ E, there exists a weight α ∈ Ω with α(a) 6= α(b).
Note that if A is unital, Ω(A) separates compatible events. Indeed, it is sufficient that, for every x ∈ E,
there exist a state α ∈ Ω(A) with α(x) > 1/2.
Lemma A.2 Let Ω(A) separate compatible events. Then
(a) There exists at most one coarsening map f : E → F ;
(b) If there exist coarsening maps f : E → F and g : F → E, then f and g are bijections and
g = f−1;
(c) If f : G→ E and g : G→ F are coarsening maps and x ∈ E∩F , then f−1(x) = g−1(x) ⊆ G.
Proof: (a) If f, g : E → F are coarsening maps, where E  F in M(A), then for every y ∈ F we have
α(f−1(y)) = α(y) = α(g−1(y)) for every α ∈ Ω(A). Hence, f−1(y) = g−1(y) for every y ∈ F , whence,
f = g. Now (b) follows, since the composition of coarsening maps is a coarsening map. For (c), observe
that if x ∈ E ∩ F , then for every state α we have α(f−1(x)) = α(x) = α(g−1(x)). Since Ω separates
compatible events, f−1(x) = g−1(x). 
From now on, assume Ω(A) separates compatible events. We will write fE,F for the unique coarsening
map f : E → F , if one exists.
Suppose now that E,F ∈M(A) have a common refinement, that is, that there exists a test G ∈M(A)
with G  E and G  F . Then we have a natural surjection φ : G→ E × F , namely
φ(z) = (fG,F (z), fG,E(z)).
If α ∈ Ω, then we have a probability weight on E × F given by
φ∗(α) := α ◦ φ−1.
This assigns to (x, y) ∈ E × F the probability
α(φ−1(x, y)) = α(ax ∩ by), where ax = f−1G,E(x) and by = f−1G,F (y).
It is easy to check that
∑
y∈F φ∗(α)(x, y) = α(x) and
∑
x∈E φ∗(α)(x, y) = α(y), i.e., φ∗(α) has the “right”
marginals to explain the probabilities that α assigns to E and F . In this sense, G can be regarded as a
joint measurement of E and F .
Definition A.3 A is a refinement ideal iff every pair of tests in M(A) has a common refinement.
In other words, A is a refinement ideal iff the preordered set (M,) is downwardly directed. Define
S ⊆ ΠE∈ME to be the set
S = {x = (xE) ∈ ΠE∈M(A) | ∀E  F fE,F (xE) = xF }, (5)
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i.e., the inverse limit of M, regarded as a small category under coarsening maps. As long as M is locally
finite, one can show that this is non-empty (a consequence of the compactness of ΠE∈ME). For each test
E ∈M(A), define fE : S → E by fE(x) = xE , and for any xo ∈ X(A), let
[xo] := { x ∈ S | ∀E ∈M(A) xo ∈ E ⇒ xE = xo }.
Note that, by Lemma A.2, if x ∈ E ∩ F , then for every x ∈ S, xE = xo iff xF = xo; hence, [xo] 6= ∅. If
a ∈ Ev(A), let [[a]] := {[x]|x ∈ a}. Notice that ⋃[[a]] = f−1E (a) where E is any test with a ⊆ E.
Recall that, if E and F are partitions of a set S, E is said to refine F iff for every y ∈ F , there is some
a ⊆ E with y = ∪a. I will write E v F to indicate this. If M is a collection of partitions of a set S such
that every pair of partitions in M has a common refinement in this sense, then I will say that M is a
refinement ideal of partitions.
Lemma A.4 If A is a locally finite refinement ideal, then with S the projective limit of M(A) in (5), for
every test E ∈M(A), [[E]] is a partition of S, and if E  F then [[E]] v [[F ]]. Hence, [[M(A)]] := {[[E]]|E ∈
M(A)} is a refinement ideal of partitions. Moreover, the mapping φ : x 7→ [x] defines an isomorphism of
test spaces from M(A) to [[M(A)]].
Proof: That [[E]] is a partition of S is clear from the definitions. If E  F , let y ∈ F , and set a = f−1E,F (y) ⊆
E. Thus, [[a]] ⊆ [[E]]. Now⋃
[[a]] = f−1E (a) = f
−1
E ◦ f−1E,F (x) = (fE,F ◦ fE)−1(x) = f−1F (y) = [y].
Thus, every cell in the partition [[F ]] is a union of cells of [[E]], i.e., E v F . Since every pair of tests in
M(A) have a common refinement with respect to Ω(A), it follows that [[M(A)]] is a refinement ideal of
partitions. It is clear that φ : x 7→ [x] is an outcome-preserving, positive interpretation from M(A) onto
[[M(A)]]. It remains to show it’s injective. Let x, y ∈ X(A) with [x] = [y]. Supposing that x ∈ E ∈M(A)
and y ∈ F ∈M(A), let G  E,F . Then f−1G,E(x) = f−1G,F (y), so for all α ∈ Ω(A), we have
α(x) = α(f−1G,E(x)) = α(f
−1
G,F (y)) = α(y).
By our standing assumption that states in Ω(A) separate outcomes in X(A), x = y. 
Now let M be a test space of partitions of a set S, and let M be a refinement ideal with respect to
ordinary refinement of partitions. Define φ : Ev(M) → P(S) by â = ∪a for all a ∈ Ev(M). Note here
that an event a is a subset of a finite partition of S, that is, a finite, pairwise disjoint set of non-empty
subsets of S. Now let
Σ := { â | a ∈ Ev(M) }.
Lemma A.5 Σ is an algebra of sets on S.
Proof: It is easy to see that if a, b ⊆ E ∈M, â ∩ b̂ = â ∩ b, â ∪ b = â ∪ b̂, and âc = Ê r a. Thus, the
set ΣE := {â|a ⊆ E} is a subalgebra of P(S). If G v E, then the definition of refinement tells us that
ΣE ⊆ ΣG. Hence, if M is a refinement ideal, {ΣE |E ∈M} is a directed family of subalgebras of P(S)
under inclusion, whence, its union is also a subalgebra. 
Now let A be a refinement ideal in the sense of probabilistic models, i.e., M(A) is a refinement ideal with
respect to Ω(A). For every α ∈ Ω(A), define
α̂(â) = α(a)
for every â ∈ Σ.
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Lemma A.6 α̂ is well-defined, and a finitely-additive probability measure on Σ.
Proof: Let a ⊆ E ∈ M and b ⊆ F ∈ M. We want to show that if â = b̂, then α(a) = α(b). Let G
refine both E and F . There are canonical surjections e : G → E and f : G → F , namely e(z) = x where
x is the unique cell of E containing z ∈ G, and similarly for f . Let a1 = e−1(a) and b1 = f−1(b). Then
â1 = â = b̂ = b̂1. Since ̂ is injective on P(G), a1 = b1. Since A is a refinement ideal with respect to Ω(A),
α(a) = α(a1) = α(b1) = α(b).
This shows that α̂ is well defined. To see that it’s additive, let a ⊆ E ∈M(A), b ⊆ F ∈M(A), with
â ∩ b̂ = ∅. Choosing G a common refinement of E and F , we have a1, b1 ⊆ G with â1 = â and b̂1 = b̂, so
â1 ∩ b̂1 = ∅, whence, a1 ∩ b1 = ∅. It follows that
α̂(â ∪ b̂) = α̂(â1 ∪ a2) = α(a1 ∪ a2) = α(a1) + α(a2)
= α̂(â1) + α̂(̂b1) = α̂(â) + α̂(̂b). 
Proposition A.7 If A is a locally finite refinement ideal and Ω(A) separates compatible events, then there
is a measurable space (S,Σ) and an embedding M(A) → D(S,Σ) such that every probability weight in Ω
extends to a finitely-additive probability measure on (S,Σ). Conversely, if A is unital and locally finite and
admits such an embedding, then A embeds in a refinement ideal without loss of states.
Proof: The forward implication follows from Lemmas A.4, A.5 and A.6, while the reverse implication is
more or less obvious. 
To this extent, then, the existence of common refinements is the key classical postulate.
B Semiclassical test spaces
Recall thatM is semiclassical iff distinct tests inM are disjoint. Evidently, such a test space has a wealth
of dispersion-free states, as we can simply choose an element xE from each test E ∈M and set δ(x) = 1
if x = xE for the unique test containing x, and 0 otherwise. In fact, the dispersion-free states are exactly
the pure states:
Lemma B.1 Let Ki be an indexed family of convex sets, and let α = (αi) ∈ K = Πi∈IKi. Then α is pure
iff each αi is pure.
Proof: Suppose that for some j ∈ I, αj is not pure. Then there exist distinct points βj , γj ∈ Kj with
αj = tβj + (1− t)γj for some t ∈ (0, 1). Define β̂, γ̂ ∈ K by setting
β̂i =
{
αi i 6= j
βj i = j
and γ̂i =
{
αi i 6= j
γj i = j
Then we have tβ̂ + (1− t)γ̂ = α, so α is not pure either. The converse is clear. 
Corollary B.2 If M is semiclassical, then Pr(M)ext = Pr(M)df.
Proof: Since M is semiclassical, Pr(M) ' ΠE∈M∆(E). 
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C Constructing fully G-symmetric models
This appendix collects more technical material on the construction of fully symmetric models. In particular,
we prove Theorem 4.7, which for convenience we restate below as Proposition C.2.
As discussed in Section 4.2, we are given a set E (which we wish to regard as the outcome-set of an
experiment), and a group H acting transitively on E. We are also given a set Ω of physical states (those
of the system to which the experiment pertains), and a function
p : Ω× E → [0, 1]
assigning a probability weight α̂ = p(α, ·) on E to each state α ∈ Ω. We are also given a group G of
“physical symmetries” acting on Ω on the right, plus a subgroup H of G acting on E (on the left), in such
a way that
p(αh, x) = p(α, hx)
for all h ∈ H. For each α ∈ Ω, we write α̂ both for the mapping G 7→ ∆(E) given by α̂(g)(x) = p(αg, x),
and for the mapping G × E → [0, 1] given by α̂(g, x) = α̂(g)(x), whichever is more convenient. Thus,
α̂g1(g2) = α̂(g1g2) for all g1, g2 ∈ G, and α̂(gh, x) = α̂(g, hx) for all g ∈ G, h ∈ H and x ∈ E. We assume
that the mapping α 7→ α̂ is injective, so that α is determined by the function α̂.
Given this data, choose and fix an outcome xo ∈ E, and let
K := {k ∈ G|∀α ∈ Ω p(αk, xo) = p(α, xo)}. (6)
Equivalently, k ∈ K iff α̂(gk, xo) = α̂(g, xo) for all g ∈ G. Notice that the stabilizer, Ho, of xo in H is a
subset of K; in particular, K is nonempty.
Lemma C.1 K ≤ G, and K ∩H = Ho.
Proof: Let k, k′ ∈ K. Then for all g ∈ G and α ∈ Ω, we have α̂(gkk′, xo) = α̂(gk, xo) = α̂(g, xo) so kk′ ∈ K;
also
α̂(gk−1, xo) = α̂((gk−1)k, xo) = α̂(g, xo)
so k−1 ∈ K. Thus, K is a subgroup of G. For the second statement, h ∈ K ∩H implies that, for all α and
all g,
α̂(g, xo) = α̂(gh, xo) = α̂(g, hxo).
Since the functions α̂(g) separate points of E, hxo = xo, so h ∈ Ho On the other hand, if h ∈ Ho, then
α̂(gh, xo) = α̂(g, hxo) = α̂(g, xo), so h ∈ K. 
We now prove Theorem 4.7, showing that any choice of a subgroup K between Ho and K generates a fully
G-symmetric test space, having Ω as its state space, in a canonical manner. For convenience, we restate
this result here:
Proposition C.2 With notation as above, suppose H acts transitively on E. Let K be any subgroup of
G with Ho ≤ K ≤ K. Set X := G/K, and let xg := gK ∈ X for all g ∈ G. Then there is a well-defined
H-equivariant injection φ : E → X given by φ(hxo) = xh for all h ∈ H. Moreover, identifying E with
φ(E) ⊆ X,
(a) M := {gφ(E)|g ∈ G} is a G-symmetric test space;
(b) For every α ∈ Ω, ˜α(xg) := α̂(g, xo) is a well-defined probability weight on M;(c) The mapping α 7→ ˜α is a G-equivariant affine injection, where G acts on ∆(E)G on theright.
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Proof: For convenience, let us write xg for the left coset gK in X = G/K. Then the mapping φ : E → X
above is given by
φ : hxo 7→ xh.
To see this is well-defined, let h, h′ ∈ H with hxo = h′xo: then h−1h′ ∈ Ho ≤ K, so that xh = xh′ .
Conversely, if xh = xh′ , we have h
−1h′ ∈ So whence hxo = h′xo, and φ is injective. If x = hxo, then
φ(h′x) = h′hK = h′xh = hφ(x), so φ is H-equivariant. This disposes of (a). Now let M = { gE˜ | g ∈ G }.
Since X is a G-set, this gives us a G test space — a symmetric one, as G acts transitively on M and H
acts transitively on φ(E) ∈M. For α ∈ Ω, set ˜α(xg) = α̂(g, xo). This is well-defined, since if xg = xg′ ,then g′ = gk for some k ∈ K, and thus
˜α(xg′) = ˜α(xgk) = α̂(gk, xo) = α̂(g, xo) = ˜α(xg).
To see that ˜α is a probability weight on M, for each x ∈ E, choose hx ∈ H with hxxo = x (recalling herethat H acts transitively on E). Then for all g ∈ G we have
˜α(gφ(x)) = ˜α(xghx) = α̂(ghx, xo) = α̂(g, hxxo) = α̂(g, x).
Thus, ∑
x∈E ˜α(gφ(x)) =
∑
x∈E
α̂(g, x) = 1.
The mapping α 7→ ˜α is obviously affine, and is injective by our assumption that α 7→ α̂ is injective. To seethat it is equivariant, note that for all g, l ∈ G and α ∈ Ω,
˜(αg)(xl) = (̂αg)(l, xo) = α̂(gl, xo) = ˜α(glxo) = ˜α(gxl) = (˜α ◦ g)(xl). 
Thus, (M, ˜Ω), where ˜Ω = {˜α|α ∈ Ω}, is a G-symmetric model with state space isomorphic to Ω.
Remarks:
(1) If Ho ≤ K ≤ K ′ ≤ K, we obtain a G-equivariant, surjective outcome-preserving interpretation
φK′,K :MK →MK′
given by φK′,K(gK) = gK
′ for all g ∈ G. So taking K = Ho gives in this sense the least constrained
symmetric G-test space containing E (in such a way as to extend the action of H on E), while K = K
gives the most constrained. Note all such test spaces have tests of the same size, namely |E|, provided
that the set of probability weights α̂(g), with α ranging over Ω and g ranging over G, is large enough to
separate points of E.
(2) Accordingly, all probability weights on MK′ pull back to probability weights on MK via φ∗K,K′ , which
is an injective G-equivariant affine mapping. Writing ΩK := Pr(MK) for the convex set of all probability
weights on MK , we have Ω ⊆ ΩK (where we identify Ω with its image ˜Ω). Thus, in particular, we canreplace Ω with Pr(MK) to obtain a larger state space with respect to which the same construction works.
Given the H-set E, we can obtain the initial data for this construction as follows. Let G be any group
containing H as a subgroup, and let
G×H E = (G× E)/ ∼
where ∼ is the equivalence relation defined by (g, x) ∼ (h, y) iff there exists some s ∈ H with h = gs and
sy = x. Letting [g, x] denote the equivalence class of (g, x), we have
[g, x] = [gs, s−1x] i.e., [gs, x] = [g, sx]
for all g ∈ G, x ∈ E and s ∈ H. Note that G×H E is a G-set, with action defined by
g[h, x] = [gh, x]
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which is well-defined because [ghs, s−1x] = [gh, x] for all s ∈ H. Now let
[g,E] := {[g, x]|x ∈ E} :
then if [h, x] ∈ [g,E], we have [h, x] = [g, y] for some y ∈ E, whence, there is some s ∈ S with h = gs
and sy = x. Then for all z ∈ E, say z = s′x, we have [h, z] = [gs, s′x] = [g, ss′x] ∈ [g,E]. That is,
[h,E] ⊆ [g,E]. By the same token, [g,E] ⊆ [h,E]. In other words, the sets [g,E] paritition G×H E. With
this observation, it is easy to prove the following
Lemma C.3 With notation as in Proposition C.2, XHo ' G ×Ho E, and MHo ' {[g,E]|g ∈ E}, a
semiclassical test space, independent of Ω.
Proof: Let φ : G× E → G/Ho = XHo be given by
φ(g, sxo) = gsHo.
To see that this is well-defined, note that if s1xo = s2xo, then s
−1
2 s1 =: s ∈ Ho, and gs1Ho = gs2sHo =
gs2Ho. Next, observe that φ(g1, s1xo) = φ(g2, s2xo) iff g1s1Ho = g2s2Ho iff g2s2 = g1s1s for some s ∈ Ho,
whence, [g2, s2xo] = [g2s2, xo] = [g1s1s, xo] = [g1, s1xo]. Thus, passing to the quotient set G ×Ho E gives
us an equivariant bijection. Since {[g,E]|g ∈ G} is a partition of G ×Ho E, we have a semiclassical tets
space, as advertised. 
Notice that the stabilizer of [e, E] in G is exactly Ho. Now choosing any G-invariant set of probability
weights on MHo — say, the orbit of any given probability weight — we have a natural G-equivariant
injection Ω→ ∆(E)G given by
α 7→ α̂ : α̂(g)(x) = α[g, x]
for all α ∈ Ω. The construction now proceeds as above for any choice of subgroup K of G with Ho ≤ K ≤ K,
where K is determined by Ω as in Equation (6). We can regard K as parametrizing the possible fully G-
symmetric models containing E as a test, and having dynamical group G. As shown above, if K = Ho,
the stabilizer of xo in H, then M is semiclassical. Larger choices of K further constrain the structure of
M, enforcing outcome-identifications between tests that, in turn, constrain any further enlargement of the
state space that we might contemplate.
32
